In his latest abstract, aviation and political expert Captain Jeffrey Anderson explains what the organization does and does not do – and how implementation of a new pilot retirement age worked in the past and would work in the future.
ICAO and U.S. Airline Pilot Retirement Age Policy
ABSTRACT
Because of its detachment from the everyday lives of Americans and their legislators, some measure of mystery surrounds the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). That cloudiness is right now being used to confuse the public and Congress on the issue of raising the U.S. airline (FAR Part 121) pilot statutory retirement age from 65 to 67. A basic and honest understanding of the organization and its place in this matter is essential to making the best legislative choice on pilot retirement age for America and the world.
ICAO is a United Nations agency; a deliberative forum and coordination facility intended to advance the harmonization of aviation policy and practices between countries of the world. It has no statutory or regulatory authority, but is influential in the formulation of aviation regulations by many countries.
While history and current indications speak strongly against the chances, were the majority of ICAO Member States found to be oriented against harmonizing the organization’s policy recommendation with a U.S. move to age 67, that could possibly impede application in overseas operations. Until such time as ICAO might choose to raise its existing age 65 recommended standard, the FAA-equivalents of some Member States may not raise their own countries’ national regulations. Under such conditions, U.S. airline pilots over age 65 would likely be restricted for the time being, to domestic flying and to international routes covered by bi- or multi-lateral agreements on pilot age. This might require that some portion of U.S. airline pilots now flying only international flights would have to be redistributed to domestic assignments, perhaps involving training on aircraft models different from what they currently operate.
The only registered opposition to raising the United States FAR Part 121 pilot retirement age limit from 65 to 67 comes from particular individuals in leadership of some U.S. airline pilot unions. Indications are quite clear that that posture has been taken solely in support of internal union political dynamics, and not on genuine aviation safety considerations. Their raising and inflating the possible ICAO/international implementation challenge described above is evidence of that. Indeed, it is very peculiar and arguably questionable that the leadership of labor unions like the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) should apply their strongest advocacy efforts to representing a non-safety and non-technical argument such as this. Application challenges and the possible costs and logistic demands associated with a federal aviation regulatory change are commonplace in the industry and are wholly corporate economic matters, not safety or labor issues. Regardless, the potential burdens of any such foreseeable necessities, even in the worst case, are absolutely de minimis compared to the aviation safety and airline reliability benefits achievable by raising the retirement age limit. Still, some influential representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association and their affiliates have developed and deployed an identifiably false ICAO narrative regarding pilot age policy in hopes it will spook U.S. legislators from doing what is clearly in the American and global public interest – that is, to raise the airline pilot retirement age.
EXPANDED DISCUSSION
ICAO is a United Nations agency. It has no statutory or regulatory authority, but is influential in the formulation of aviation regulations by many countries:
Every ICAO Member State, indeed every nation of the world, controls its own aviation regulations, typically through some FAA-equivalent in their government. The role played by ICAO as an agency is that it provides a forum to discuss aviation policy and share data, and may choose as a democratic action of its Assembly, to issue Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) on certain topics. Those SARPs may then be used as a basis for individual national authorities to formulate their own policies, practices and regulations.
While history and current indications speak strongly against the chances, were the majority of ICAO Member States found to be oriented against harmonizing the organization’s policy recommendation with a U.S. move to age 67, that could possibly impede application in overseas operations:
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated staffing challenges in the airline pilot sector by triggering an early mass-exodus of senior, experienced aviators, America and the world were suffering a shortage. The impacts of that fell into two categories: flight safety and airline reliability. Ahead of the U.S., ICAO member nations, both independently and collectively, were exploring means to navigate those challenges, including consideration of raising, or even eliminating, specific pilot retirement age limits. As recently as August, 2023, when a United States Congressional Delegation attended the ICAO meeting in Montreal and met with Organization officials, conversations indicated that that body is not at all opposed to moving in that direction. In September 2023, the highly influential industry component of ICAO, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), wrote to Congress in support of raising the U.S. FAR Part 121 pilot retirement age, reflective of the prevailing attitude and direction within ICAO to do the same. Just this month, January, 2024, ICAO is engaged in internal discussion regarding the possibility of facilitating uninterrupted international operations and streamlining the harmonization of pilot age policy differences between nations by refashioning its suspended Covid-19 Contingency Related Differences (CCRD) portal to address pilot age. Historically, the innovation, leadership and front-end action of significant Member States (such as the U.S.) have been the genesis of compatible action by ICAO. The inference of necessary “studies” having been performed, or needing to be performed ahead of any ICAO or U.S. rules change on pilot age are factually false. Indeed, Dr. Claus Curdt-Christiansen, M.D., D.Av.Med, ICAO Chief of Aviation Medicine at the time the organization revised its standard from age 60 to 65, is on record that, “neither ICAO … nor any related agency conducted any research into pilot health/age before the upper age limit was changed.” In any regard, ample data for safe commercial operation by pilots over the age of 65 already exists. Calls for such prerequisite studies appear to be purely a delay tactic. Were those to actually be considered necessary, the standard FAA practice for this sort of matter is to go ahead and institute the proposed regulatory change and set up an observation and assessment protocol alongside (reference the highly successful Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). In summary, all signals point to the likelihood that there will be no significant ICAO or other impediments to international implementation of a U.S. regulatory change to raise the airline pilot retirement age limit to 67.
Still, it is absolutely true that some portion of countries in the world simply rely on the output of ICAO, and specifically SARPs, to build their aviation regulation portfolio. To that extent, a U.S. age policy different from the current ICAO standard may present a temporary or even long-term obstacle to American airline pilots older than 65 being able to fly into, out of, or perhaps even over certain countries. Counter to that, all countries have the individual freedom, which they regularly exercise, to enter into mutual agreements that permit operations not in specific compliance with related ICAO SARPs. Such bi- and multi-lateral agreements, especially on a matter as simple in nature and narrow of gauge as a mere two-year difference in age limit are typically negotiated and executed within a timeframe of a few weeks (even days), to a few months. Once a constructive template is established for one agreement, others tend to generate with increasing rapidity.
… This might require that some portion of U.S. airline pilots now flying only international flights would have to be redistributed to domestic assignments, perhaps involving training on aircraft models different from what they currently operate … Application challenges and the possible costs and logistic demands associated with a federal aviation regulatory change are commonplace in the industry and are wholly corporate economic matters … Regardless, the potential burdens of any such foreseeable necessities, even in the worst case, are absolutely de minimis compared to the aviation safety and airline reliability benefits achievable by raising the retirement age limit:
Details matter. The data for individual carriers and the particulars of their staffing systems are widely available. Those should absolutely be referenced and considered. The purpose of this discussion is to address the context and structure within which that information should be pursued and processed. The germane fact is that were there to be some portion of retained pilots subject to domestic reassignment, the associated costs and logistic demands would be minimal, and to a great extent, offset by collateral savings, efficiencies and revenue opportunities gained by air carriers through retaining their experienced pilots to age 67. The most demonstrative example is that at major airlines like Delta, an unnecessarily forced senior pilot retirement triggers seven to nine vertical position moves, almost all with expensive required training and lengthy absences of availability from revenue flying. Conversely, the flip-flopping of each international pilot for a domestic reassignment only might trigger two such events.
This is the odd space where those opposed to raising the retirement limit on other actual bases are making their inferential argument that IF ICAO somehow prevented U.S. pilots from operating internationally for any length of time, the reassignment and possible retraining described above would be prohibitively expensive and “chaotic” for companies, even perhaps requiring “the reopening and renegotiation of existing pilot contracts.” In the same questioning vein that one wonders why ALPA and other union enterprises would focus on looking out for ICAO’s or any interests other than their own members’, policymakers have to ask why the association would so strongly stand up for, even falsely, the interests of airline corporations over those of pilots? In fact, there is no history that the far more impactful pilot retirement age limit change from 60 to 65 (circa 2006-2007) required any reopening or renegotiation of any pilot working agreements. Similarly, ALPA has not identified any contract sections on any property that would require significant modification now.
CONCLUSION
Relative to the demand for same, there is an undeniable shortage of experienced airline pilots in the United States and globally. This condition is contributing to obvious and increasing aviation safety hazards and airline reliability problems. Increasing the FAR Part 121 airline pilot retirement age to 67 will contribute factually and substantially to improving both conditions. Neither the processes of the International Civil Aviation Organization, nor any nation are likely to impede application of this updated standard to international operations. For those still concerned, repeating compromise accommodations such as the “gray on gray” provisions utilized during implementation of the increase from age 60 to 65 (wherein, it was mandated for a specific period that affected flight crews include at least one member under age 60), should easily suffice. There are likewise, no compelling industrial cost, training logistics or contractual burdens or obstacles to prevent, or that would substantially devalue the great benefit to air carriers and the public of raising the airline pilot retirement age.
Captain Jeffrey C. Anderson
January 26, 2024
Captain Anderson is a Navy veteran and 33-year airline pilot for a major U.S. carrier. He is also a 33-year member of the Air Line Pilots Association, International and previously served ALPA as a pilot labor contract negotiator and government affairs chair.